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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge

JURISDICTION
This appeal is from an final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, entered in favor of Defendants Sumerset Houseboats, Div. SMI ("Sumerset"), and its
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president James E. Sharpe ("Sharpe") on September 4, 1996 after a jury trial. R. 1771-72. Appellant
UTCO Associates ("UTCO") initially filed this appeal in the Utah Supreme Court (No. 960446),
which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). On March 19, 1997, the
Utah Supreme Court poured over this appeal to this Court for disposition (No. 970190-CA).
R. 1798. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this appeal therefore rests upon its pour-over
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k)(1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The broad issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusions at trial when
it (a) dismissed UTCO's promissory estoppel claims sua sponte and when it (b) instructed to the jury
regarding defenses not pled by defendants; (c) failed to give several of instructions to the jury
regarding the defendants' changing of identifying serial numbers on the Houseboat, the parties'
course of dealing, and damages for loss use of property; and (d) granted defendants' motions in limine
which precluded UTCO from introducing evidence that the Houseboat serial numbers previously sent
to UTCO had been changed by defendants and that a boat bearing the serial number of the Houseboat
was subsequently sold by defendants.1 With the foregoing broad issues in mind, UTCO presents the
following questions for review by this Court.
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing sua sponte to instruct the jury on UTCO's claim for

promissory estoppel prior to instructing the jury, which effectively dismissed said claim. Determining
whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error presents a

defendants filed three "combined'* Motions in Limine, one on July 11. 1997 and two more on the morning of
July 22. 1997, Record at 1486-90. 1541-47. 1560-65. The trial court then granted the motions prior to the
beginning of the trial. Record at 1904-10.

-2-

question of law, to which this Court gives no deference. Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1386
(Utah 1995).
2.

^.XUOk-atAV
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting defendants' motion in limine which

precluded UTCO from introducing evidence on its fraud and negligent misrepresentaiton claims that:
1) the serial numbers on the Houseboats had been altered by defendants; 2) the Houseboat serial
numbers previously sent to UTCO by Sumerset and Sharpe had been changed by defendants; 3) a
boat bearing the serial number of the Houseboat was subsequently sold by defendants.2 In reviewing
questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial court's advantageous
position. Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992) (quoting Whitehead v. American
Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990)). Accordingly, this Court does not reverse the
trial court's evidentiary decisions made pursuant to Rules 401 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
unless the court clearly abused its discretion. See State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); Nay
v. General Motors Corp.. 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993).
3.

Did the trial court err in instructing the jury regarding defendants' alleged "different

motivations" and "inferred intent" for purposes of analyzing fraudulent intent. R. 1637, 2612-13. A
party is entitled to a new trial where it shows that the trial court erroneously or insufficiently
instructed the jury, or that the instruction mislead the jury and was prejudicial to the complaining

"The Court further precluded plaintiff from presenting evidence of any complaint, conversation or investigation
by any government agency, including the F.B.I, and precluded plaintiff from presenting the testimony of Ellen'
Sumner and Ken Crooks, the principal investigators for the F.B.I, and the Division of Motor Vehicles regarding
the reassignment of the serial numbers, respectively, as witnesses. Defendantsfiledthree "combined" Motions in
Limine, one on July 11. 1997 and two more on the morning of July 22, 1997. Record at 1486-90. 1541-47. 156065. The trial court then granted the motions prior to the beginning of the trial. Record at 1904-10.
-3-

party. Vitale v. Belmont Springs. 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah Ct App. 1996). Determining whether the
trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error presents a question of law,
to which this Court gives no deference. Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Rule 123 and Rule 41, 4 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff appeals from the final judgment of the trial court after a jury verdict. Plaintiff filed
this action for damages as against Sumerset Houseboats, Div. SMI's ("Sumerset") and Sharpe for
their failure to deliver a Houseboat after receipt of $60,000.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
UTCO filed its Complaint in this case on July 21, 1993, alleging that defendants Sharpe and
Sumerset failed to send a Houseboat as they promised after receiving the Funds from UTCO. The
Complaint was later amended and alleges causes of action for breach of contract, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, foreclosure of security interest, conspiracy, conversion, implied contract, disregard
of the corporate entity of Sumerset and seeking prejudgment interest and punitive damages. R. 1-11.
Defendant Zimmerman answered the Complaint, denied liability, and affirmatively defended on the

3

4

Addendum A.

Addendum B

basis that they had not made the alleged representations to plaintiff, and that he was entitled to retain
the money sent by plaintiff in any event.

R. 18-27. Defendant Zimmerman further filed a

Counterclaim on August 25, 1993. On June 16, 1995 in response to the filing of plaintiff s Second
Amended Complaint, R. 561-79, Defendants Sharpe and Sumerset filed an answer, and defendant
Sumerset filed a counterclaim and third party complaint alleging that plaintiff and its attorneys had
conspired to defraud Sumerset. R. 583-607,639-655. On February 26, 1996, the trial court entered
its order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and determined that the First
Cause of Action of the Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint, and defendants' Eighth and Ninth
Affirmative Defenses should be dismissed. R. 1438-43. On February 9, 1996, UTCO filed its
Answer to the only remaining cause of action in the Counterclaim. R. 1303-06.
The trial court, sitting without a jury, tried this action on July 22, 23, 25, 29, and 30. During
the course of the trial, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims for conversion, quantum meruit,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, foreclosure of security interest, and conspiracy
and plaintiff presented no evidence in support of its Counterclaim. After the evidence was completed
and just prior to instructing the jury, the Court dismissed sua sponte plaintiffs claim for promissory
estoppel despite plaintiffs objection thereto. The jury was only instructed regarding plaintiffs claims
for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The jury returned a special verdict on
July 30, 1996 in favor of defendants. R. 1670-72. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on
September 4, 1996. R.1771-73. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 1, 1996. R.1774-79.
This is an appeal from the entire judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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1.

UTCO is a Utah limited partnership duly organized under the laws of the State of Utah

and has its principal place of business located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. R.561. Robert D.
Kent is a general partner of plaintiff. R.561. Defendant K. DeMarr Zimmerman ("Zimmerman") is
a resident of Davis County, State of Utah, transacting business primarily in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah. R.561-62,640. Zimmerman commenced a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code on October 6, 1993. R.561-62,640. Defendant Sumerset Houseboats, SMI Div.
("Sumerset") has its principal place of business in Somerset, Kentucky. R.640 Sumerset is in the
business of selling and shipping houseboats and has shipped houseboats to Zimmerman's place of
business and other location specified by Zimmerman in Utah. R. 640, 2091-93. Sumerset has had
other substantial contacts with plaintiff in the State of Utah. R. 2091-93. Defendant James E.
Sharpe ("Sharpe") is an individual who is the president and sole shareholder of Sumerset and resides
in or near Somerset, Kentucky. R. 640.
On or about November 20, 1992, Zimmerman arranged to purchase from Sumerset a 1993
Sumerset Houseboat, Serial No. SZJ02021C393, together with two motors and a generator
(collectively referred to as the "Houseboat"), as evidenced by Sumerset's invoice No. 04009.
R.563,641.
Bruce J. Nelson ("Nelson"), plaintiffs former counsel, had previously arranged for houseboat
financing for Zimmerman to purchase other houseboats from Sumerset such that plaintiff, Zimmerman
and Sharpe had established a course of dealing regarding Zimmerman's purchase of houseboats from
Sumerset. R.563,641. Pursuant to instructions given by Zimmerman, Sumerset and Sharpe sent the
original Manufacturer's Statement of Origin ("MSO") to Nelson. R.563,641.
-6-

Sharpe and Sumerset sent the MSO to Nelson to induce plaintiff to send $58,384 (the
"Funds") to Sharpe and Sumerset in payment of a portion of the purchase price of the Houseboat.
R.2095. Sharpe, in a telephone conversation with Nelson, agreed to deliver the Houseboat to
Zimmerman's place of business in Utah upon receipt of the Funds, which Sharpe alleged constituted
the portion of the purchase price necessary for Sumerset to ship the Houseboat to Zimmerman in
Utah. R. 2198-99.
On or about December 22, 1992, and based upon Sharpe1 s promise to Nelson to ship the
Houseboat to Utah upon receipt of $58,384, plaintiff agreed to loan (the "Loan") Zimmerman the
sum of $60,000fromwhich Zimmerman would pay a portion of the purchase price of the Houseboat.
R.2197-99. At the time of the Loan and to evidence the same, Zimmerman executed a Note (the
"Note") which called for repayment of the $60,000 under the terms and conditions stated therein.
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 19. At the time of the execution of the Note, Zimmerman also executed a
Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement") in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 20. By
the terms of the Security Agreement, Zimmerman pledged the Houseboat as collateral security for
the Note. Id- A description of such collateral was attached to the Complaint. R.579.
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement between plaintiff and defendants and their prior course
of dealing, and in reliance on the promises and representations of Sharpe and Sumerset, plaintiff
caused the Funds to be wired to Sumerset and Sharpe on or about December 29, 1992. R.219699,2278-79.
On December 29, 1992, the same day the Funds were received by Sumerset, Sharpe and
Sumerset did not apply the Funds to the purchase of the Houseboat as represented to plaintiff, but
-7-

instead fraudulently applied the Funds to Zimmerman's purchase of another houseboat from Sumerset.
R. 1005-08. Sometime between December 29, 1992 and March 9, 1993, Zimmerman, Sharpe and
Sumerset attempted to void the sale of the Houseboat to Zimmerman. R. 565,642, 2075-76.
Zimmerman, Sharpe and Sumerset did not give notice to plaintiff that they had attempted to void the
sale of the Houseboat. R.2077.
Sharpe and Sumerset thereafter reassigned the serial number for the Houseboat shown on the
MSO sent to Nelson to a second, different houseboat manufactured by Sharpe and Sumerset. R.643.
Sharpe and Sumerset then sold the "second" houseboat to John Runda, and issued a second MSO to
Runda, which bears the same serial number as the first MSO sent to Nelson. R.643.
The Houseboat never existed and there is no boat which is of the dimensions and has the
features described in the invoice sent by defendants to plaintiff which bears Serial No.
SZJ02021C393. R565,643.
The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion in limine on the first day of trial, July
22, 1996. R. 1904-10. The Court then precluded UTCO from introducing evidence that the
Houseboat serial numbers previously sent to UTCO had been changed by defendants and that a boat
bearing the serial number of the Houseboat was subsequently sold by defendants.5 The Court further
precluded plaintiff from presenting evidence of any complaint, conversation or investigation by any
government agency, including the F.B.L and precluded plaintiff from presenting the testimony of
Ellery Summer and Ken Crooks, the chief investigators for the F.B.L and the Division of Motor

defendantsfiledthree ''combined" Motions in Limine, one on July 1L 1997 and two more on the morning of
July 22. 1997. Record at 1486-90. 1541-47. 1560-65. The trial court then granted the motions prior to the
beginning of the trial. Record at 1904-10.
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Vehicles, respectively, as witnesses. R. 1541-47,1560-64,1904-10.
After the close of the evidence and prior to instructing the jury, the trial court erroneously
dismissed plaintiffs claim for promissory estoppel sua sponte and refused to instruct the jury on
UTCO's promissory estoppel. The Court stated:
I've indicated in chambers that I was not instructing on the equitable causes
of action of promisory [sic] estoppel. For the record, the reasons I have determined
not to do that is, I am satisfied the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law and, I
believe, it is the rule that equitable remedy is not available as long as there is an
adequate remedy at law. And I believe there is here.
Also, I am satisfied that the concept of promissory estoppel basically mirrors
the causes of action that are being asserted in this case by the plaintiff. And they'll
just be surplasage.
Finally, I'm satisfied that the court of appeals case that was cited to me by
plaintiffs counsel, saying that they seem to suggest that the court must send equitable
causes of action to the jury is factually distinguishable in this case and I'm satisfied it
would be inappropriate to submit that equitable claim to a jury, if it was otherwise
proper. R.2606-07.
Later, plaintiff objected to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury regarding the plaintiffs
promissory estoppel claim:
Mr. Gibb: In light of the court's ruling, I don't believe I need to address our
exception to Number 18, which was entitled "Promissory Estoppel". The Court has
addressed that fully in its ruling and your record, I believe, previously, with respect to that
issue.
The Court: Just as long as the record shows that any offered exceptions, or any
offered instructions that you submitted in this matter have not been given because of that
ruling and that you have an exception to those.
Mr. Gibb: Correct, your Honor. We believe that Instruction Number 18 on
promisory [sic] estoppel did adequately state the law. R.2611.
The trial court also refused to instruct the jury on plaintiffs proposed jury instructions
-9-

regarding the defendants' changing of identifying serial numbers on the Houseboat, and damages for
loss use of property. R. 2610-11. This loss of use of the property was for consequential damages
suffered by UTCO as a result of the loss of the money sent to Sumerset and Sharpe.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
After more than three years of litigation and on the last day of a five-day jury trial, the trial
court for the first time informed UTCO that it was refusing to instruct the jury on UTCO's
promissory estoppel claim. The trial court cited procedural arguments as a basis for its decision
despite the fact that the parties had consented to have the issued tried by the jury. The trial court's
sua sponte refusal to instruct the jury on the issue of promissory estoppel is contrary to Utah law
allowing such claims to be tried to a jury where the parties consent thereto. The promissory estoppel
claim was not surplusage as the trial court held. Accordingly, UTCO is entitled to a new trial on its
claim for promissory estoppel.
The trial court also improperly prohibited UTCO from presenting evidence that Sumerset and
Sharpe had changed the serial numbers on the Houseboat they promised to send to UTCO and further
precluded UTCO from introducing evidence that a boat with different dimensions but bearing the
same serial number as was sent to UTCO was sold by Sumerset and Sharpe. Under Utah law,
fraudulent intent is determined by weighing all surrounding circumstances including those which
occur after the fraudulent representation is made because the law recognizes that there is rarely direct
evidence of fraud. The trial court erred in excluding evidence described in Sharpe and Sumerset's
motion in limine including the changed serial numbers and the subsequent sale to a third person.
UTCO is entitled to a new trial on its fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.
-10-

ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUA SPONTE DISMISSED
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.

On July 30, 1996, after the close of the evidence and just prior to instructing the jury, the trial
court announced that it was dismissing sua sponte plaintiffs claim for promissory estoppel. The trial
court stated:
I am satisfied the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law and . . .that the concept
of promissory estoppel basically mirrors the causes of action that are being asserted in this
case by the plaintiff. And they'll just be surplasage.
Finally,. . .I'm satisfied it would be inappropriate to submit that equitable claim to a
jury, if it was otherwise proper.
R.2606-07. The trial court did not state whether the sua sponte refusal to instruct the jury on
UTCO's promissory estoppel claim was under Rule 12 or Rule 41, or whether it was a directed
verdict. However, the trial court's failure to cite its basis for refusing to instruct the jury on UTCO's
promissory estoppel claim is of no moment as this Court pays no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions decided under any of these rules. This Court reviews for correctness the trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury regarding plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim. Cornia v. Wilcox. 898
P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995).
A,

THE PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN
PRESENTED TO THE JURY.

Although promissory estoppel is an equitable claim for relief which is normally tried
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to the bench,6 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow the jury to act as a factfinder in an equity
action: "In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may
try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury
whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right."7 The parties had both
agreed that the promissory estoppel claim should be submitted to the jury. Both parties had prepared
jury instructions on that claim The parties knew and agreed to present their case to the jury as
evidenced by Defendants demand for a jury trial regarding all issues8 and the lack of objection from
either party to the trial court's scheduling order and the pretrial order which ordered that the entire
case be for a jury trial.9 In spite of that consent to submit the issue to the jury, the trial court sua
6

See Tolhoe Constr. v. Stoker Pming & Constr.. 682 P.2d 843. 849 (Utah 1984).

7

Rule 39(c). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Goldberg, 896 P.2d at 1242 (Citing Nicholson v. Evans, 642
P 2d 727. 728 (Utah 1982); Romre/lv. lions First Nat'l Bonk, 611 P.2d 392. 394 (Utah 1980); WiUardM. Milne
Inv. Co. v. Car, 580 P.2d 607. 609 (Utah 1978); Andreoson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171. 174
(Utah App. 1993); see also 5 James W. Moore et al.. Moore's Federal Practice U 39.04 (1994) (stating verdict has
effect of common law verdict, although action formerly would have been in equity)).
8

Recordat583. 606.

9

Although a jury trial on all issues was not formally stipulated to. it is clear on a review of the record and the
Court's scheduling and pretrial orders that all parties thought all issues were being tried to a jury. Record at
583.606.1431.1692. Further under Utah law, "[e]\press consent is unnecessary." Goldberg v. Jay Timmons &
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spoiite found that it would be "inappropriate to submit that equitable claim to a jury." R.2607. This
was error. The trial court's refusal to instruct was not based on the merits of the claim, but on
procedural grounds. The trial court gave three procedural reasons for its refusal to instruct. It did
not assess or weigh the evidence submitted by UTCO in support of its promissory estoppel claim.
The Court found that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, the promissory estoppel claim was
"surplusage" and that it would be inappropriate to send an equitable claim to the jury for adjudication.
R.2606-07.
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on UTCO's
promissory estoppel claim. The trial court further compounded that error when it failed to notify the
parties until the close of the evidence that the jury would not be consulted and that it would refuse
to instruct the jury regarding UTCO's promissory estoppel. In Goldberg v. Jay Timmons &
Associates. 896 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court stated:

Associates,S96 P.2d 1241. n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. \995){citing Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d
49. 52 (3d Cir. 1989). The Goldberg court further concluded:
Giving the jury's verdict full significance in Nicholson, the court found persuasive that
plaintiffs demanded a jury trial with defendants' apparent acquiescence, and the
proceedings went forward as if the entire case were being tried by jury as a matter of
right. Consequently, it is appropriate for this Court to review the decisions of the judge
and jury on that same basis.
Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P. 2d 727, 728; see also Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d885. 888 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding parties consented to jury trial of equitable issues under Federal Rule 39(c) because "the parties
agreed and the court ordered on several occasions that the matter be tried as a jury case1'); Bereda v. Pickering
Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49. 52 (3d Cir. 1989). ("Since [both parties] requested a jury trial and the subject
of an advisory jury was never mentioned at any time during the proceedings, [the parties] must be deemed to have
consented to a trial by a nonadvisory jury under Rule 39(c).").
Those same points are persuasive in this action. Record at 583. 606. 1431. 1692.
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Federal courts have addressed the issue of when a court must notify parties that a
jury's verdict will be advisory and nonbinding in cases in which the parties have
otherwise consented to a binding jury trial. See Thompson. 963 F.2d at 888-90;
Bereda, 865 F.2d at 52-53. Those courts conclude that "considerations of fairness
to the litigants indicate that Rule 39(c) should not be interpreted to allow a district
judge to rule a jury verdict advisory after the parties have begun to implement their
trial plan."10
We agree with the federal courts' interpretation of Rule 39(c) and hold ithe
trial court had intended "of its own initiative," Utah R.Civ.P. 39(c), to use an advisory
jury, it should have notified the parties before the trial began. See Winegar v. Slim
Olson. Inc.. 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205, 207 (1953) (holding because Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure were fashioned after federal rules, we may examine decisions under
federal rules to determine meaning of Utah rules)

B.

DAMAGES ARE THE REMEDY FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
CLAIMS.

A cause of action for promissory estoppel requires the equitable enforcement of a promise and
the award of damages, a legal remedy, for breach of that promise. In Topik v. Thurber. 739 P.2d

l0

Citing Bereda, 865 F.2d at 53; Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 662.
664 (E.D.Pa. 1990): see also Thompson, 963 F.2d at 889 ("The parties are entitled to know prior to trial whether
the jury or the court will be the trier of fact."); A KM Corp. v. Corporate Aircraft Management, 626 F.Supp.
1533. 1551 (D.Mass. 1985) ("It strikes the [c]ourt as unfair and inequitable to permit a party to wait and see what
the jury's verdict will be before making application to the [c]ourt to employ a rule 39(c) advisory jury.");
Hildebrandv. Board of Trustees, 607 F.2d 705. 710 (6th Cir.1979) ("To convert a trial from a jury trial to a bench
trial... in the middle of the proceedings is to interfere with counsel's presentation of their case and. quite possibly,
to prejudice one side or the other."); 5 Moore et al.. supra, H 39.10[1] ("[T]he court should give advance notice to
the parties when it plans to use an advisory jury."). But see MerexA.G. v. Kairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d
821. 823. 827 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 39(c) "by waiting until
mid-way through trial before telling the parties that the verdict would not be binding." but stating advance notice is
"preferable")**).
The Goldberg court further observed:
"First." '[a]ny good trial lawyer will testify that there are significant tactical differences in presenting and arguing
a case to a jury as opposed to a judge.'" Bereda, 865 F.2d at 53 (quoting Hildebrand, 607 F.2d at 710). Second.
the parties "will have been able to conduct voir dire with the knowledge of the role the jury will play in the case."
Bereda, 865 F.2d at 53. And finally. "[a]ll jury verdicts in cases not triable by right by a jury would effectively be
advisory, as the [trial] judge could always rule that the verdict was advisory- if the judge did not agree with the
jury's verdict." Id. at 52.** 896 P.2d at 1243.
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1101 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "The doctrine of promissory estoppel has
application when a promise is made which can reasonably be expected to induce action or forbearance
and which in fact induces action or forbearance from which a detriment is suffered." Utah courts
have traditionally allowed a flexible approach in granting remedies for breach of a promise which is
enforced pursuant to promissory estoppel. In Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.. 848 P.2d 171,
176 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court stated, "While the damages must be limited to those incurred
through reasonable reliance, the flexible and equitable nature of promissory estoppel allows for
damages even where the plaintiff receives a benefit such as improved health, a repaired car, or a
repaired home." In Ouagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders. Inc.. 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the promissor's failure to perform in accordance with what it had promised
under the terms of the contract constituted a breach "which entitled plaintiffs to compensation for the
injury caused thereby." Li at 310.
While the enforcement of the promise is equitable in nature, remedies under a promissory
estoppel claim are legal and require the awarding of damages for breach of a promise. Because both
legal and equitable claims were alleged by UTCO, the equitable claims should have been submitted
to the jury as well. In Zions First Nafl Bank v. Rocky Mtn. Irr. Inc.. 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1990),
the Court stated:
In the federal courts, there is no question that when legal and equitable issues turn on
the same operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first; the jury's factual
determination binds the trial court in its determination of the parallel equitable issue.
We approve of this procedure.
The trial court should not have reserved the issue of fraudulent alteration to
itself The court compounded its error by directing a verdict on the issue as it related
-15-

to the RICE counterclaim. There is abundant evidence in the record to support a
finding of material, fraudulent alteration, especially when viewed in the light most
favorable to Rocky Mountain.
Id. (Citations omitted). The trial court should have instructed the jury on promissory estoppel. That
error was compounded because the jury had properly heard the evidence supporting promissory
estoppel claim and "damage assessment is peculiarly a jury function."11 The trial court should have
allowed plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim to be decided by the jury.
C

BECAUSE THE JURY DID NOT FIND A CONTRACT EXISTED
UTCO DID NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW" AND
THE
PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL
CLAIM
WAS
NOT
"SURPLUSAGE."

The trial court erroneously held: "plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law and, I believe, it
is the rule that equitable remedy is not available as long as there is an adequate remedy at law. And
I believe there is here." R.2606. Though it is true that where there is an adequate remedy at law, no
equitable remedy will be implied,12 the trial court mistakenly concluded that the jury would find that
there was an express contract between the parties. However, the promissory estoppel claim was not
redundant because the jury found that there was no breach of contract, and, in fact, no contract
between UTCO and Sharpe. The jury found that UTCO was not entitled to recover on its breach of
contract claim against Sharpe. R.1672 (Special Interrogatory No. 7).

Next to the special

n

Battyv. Mitchell 575 P.2d 1040. 1043 (Utah 1978).

"See American Towers Owners' Association, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182. 1193 (Utah
1996)(" [I]f a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an express contract, the law will not imply the equitable
remedy of unjust enrichment." Citing Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461. 465 (Utah 1978)
("Recovery in quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the
litigation."); Dories v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264. 268 (Utah.Ct.App.1987) ("Recovery under quantum meruit
presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists.").
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interrogatory on the verdict form, the jury wrote: "No contract UTCO/Sharpe." R. 1672. Because
the jury found that there was no breach of contract, UTCO did not have an adequate remedy at law.13
The jury should have been allowed to make factual findings regarding UTCO's promissory estoppel
claim as a separate and independent claim.
The question should have been submitted to the jury, to which Sharpe had no objection, and
because the operative facts support legal and equitable causes of action. In this case, the jury did not
receive the opportunity to adjudicate the facts as the parties consented and to find, as an alternative
to the breach of contract claim, that Sharpe was liable on a theory of promissory estoppel. See
Billings v. Union Bankers' Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 467(Utah 1996)(jury may properly consider
alternate theories on same set of facts). The trial court simply erred when it refused to instruct the
jury on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim.
The trial court's basis for its refusal to instruct on that claim should not withstand the scrutiny
of this Court. The trial court held that the promissory estoppel claim was "surplusage." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "surplasage" as "extraneous, impertinent, superfluous, or unnecessary matter."
Black's Law Dictionary, 572 (5th ed. 1983).14 This Court should hold that UTCO's promissory
estoppel claim was an independent and separate claim from all of UTCO's other claims and that it
was not "surplusage."
While the operative facts may be similar, the elements of a claim for fraud or negligent

13

Record at 1671-72.

14

Addendum E.
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misrepresentation and the elements of a claim for promissory estoppel are different and are not
redundant. Indeed, the burden of proof for fraud is clear and convincing evidence while the burden
of proof for promissory estoppel is a preponderance of the evidence. The differing burdens of proof
provide a further distinction between the misrepresentation claims and the promissory estoppel claims.
The trial court erred in its conclusion that an adequate remedy at law existed and that the promissory
estoppel claim was "surplusage." The court should have allowed the jury to make findings with
respect to the promissory estoppel claim.
D.

UTCO PRESENTED ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO HAVE THE JURY
DECIDE PLAINTIFF'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM.

The trial court did not make any determination as to the merits of UTCO's promissory
estoppel claim. Its refusal to instruct the jury was based solely on procedural grounds. The court
did not, for example, direct a verdict against UTCO based on insufficiency of the evidence presented.
Even so, ample evidence was introduced at trial to support the promissory estoppel claim. UTCO
introduced evidence that Sharpe promised to send a boat upon receipt of money from UTCO and that
Sharpe reasonably expected the promise to induce action or forbearance. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, Section 90 (1979). The evidence showed that the promise did in fact induce action or
forbearance by UTCO from which a detriment was suffered. UTCO presented evidence that Sharpe
had promised that he would ship the Houseboat to Utah upon receipt of moneys from UTCO's
attorney, Mr. Bruce J. Nelson.75 Indeed, Sharpe admitted that his promise induced UTCO to send

15

Record at 2198-99.
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funds on or about December 29, 1992 to Sumerset.16 Thereafter, Sharpe and Sumerset allege in their
Amended Answer, that the "sale of the Houseboat to Zimmerman was terminated by Zimmerman and
at the request of Zimmerman, the funds that had been paid toward purchase of this houseboat were
credited to other accounts of Zimmerman with Sumerset." R.642-43. They also admit that "the
serial number shown on the MSO sent to Nelson was assigned to a different houseboat than the
houseboat which Zimmerman had agreed to purchase" and "that Sumerset sold a houseboat to a John
Runda which bears the same serial number as the MSO sent to Nelson". R.642-43.
Sharpe testified that he had a "little trail going" or "course of dealing" with UTCO whereby
UTCO would send money to obtain an interest in a boat which had been or would be shipped by
defendants to Utah. R2092-93. Sharpe further admitted that he never told Nelson that he was going
to apply the payment of $58,384 to the amount Zimmerman owed Sharpe on another boat. R. 2077.
Sharpe also testified that when he was sending MSOs to Nelson he understood that Nelson "would
be using that as collateral on the boat" and that the MSO was required to license the boat in another
state. R.2095. Finally, Sharpe admitted that the boat described in the MSO and other documents
sent to Nelson "was never manufactured by Sumerset." R.2097-98.
Sharpe testified under cross-examination that he had admitted in his answers to interrogatories
that the $58,384 was applied the same day it was received to the other boat. R.2148-50. Nelson
testified that he called Sharpe on numerous occasions and verified that if UTCO sent $58,384.00,
Sharpe would send a boat described in the MSO and other documents that Sharpe had previously sent

'Record at 2060-61. 2092-93.
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to Nelson R 2196-99

Upon receiving Mr Sharpe's assurances that a boat would be sent upon

receipt of the $58,384, Mr Nelson sent the money to Sumerset R 2199-2202 Nelson testified that
he found out that the boat bearing the serial number on the MSO sent to Nelson had been sold to
another person R 2210-11 Although defendants later objected to this line of questioning, they did
not move to strike Mr Nelson's testimony that a boat bearing the serial number sent to Nelson was
sold to a third party Accordingly, the trial court should have allowed plaintiff to put on evidence and
should have instructed the jury regarding the changing of identification numbers described in
defendants' motion in limine 17
In sum, UTCO presented adequate evidence in support of its promissory estoppel claim The
evidence supported each element of the promissory estoppel claim as shown above The jury could
have reasonably found for UTCO on its promissory estoppel claim based on that evidence UTCO
is prejudiced because the trial court refused to instruct or otherwise adjudicate UTCO's promissory
estoppel claim and UTCO is therefore entitled to a new trial on its claim for promissory estoppel
The judgment should be reversed

1

'See lions First Nat 7 Bank v Rockv Mtn Irr Inc . 795 P 2d 658. 663-64 (Utah 1990)COur rules of ci\ ll
procedure require that the pleadings be conformed to the evidence presented at trial when no objection is made to
the introduction of such eudence Utah R Ci\ P 15(b). see Paulsen v Paulsen. 672 P 2d 97 (Utah 1983)
(mandator} for trial court to grant k^rse to amend to conform to evidence). General Ins Co v Carmcero Dvnastv
Corp . 545 P 2d 502. 505-06 (Utah 1976) (failure to object to eudence outside scope of pleadings is implied
consent to try issue raised b> such e\ idence) The trial court has no discretion to deny such an amendment
General Ins Co . 545 P 2d at 506 B\ not giving the proposed instructions on common law fraud and attempted
theft hv deception, the trial court failed to comply \\ ith rule 15(h) Furthermore, our case law requires that the trial
court instruct the jur> on each partys theon of the case so long as it is supported b\ competent eudence See, e g.
Powers v Gene's Bldg Materials, Inc . 567 P 2d 174. 176 (Utah 1977). Pacific ChromaloxDiv v Irew 787 P 2d
1319. 1328 (Utah Ct App 1990) ")(Emphasis added)
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1L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE THAT SHARPE
CHANGED THE SERIAL NUMBERS ON BOATS AND SOLD THE BOAT
TO ANOTHER PARTY.18

On July 11, 1993, defendants filed their first "combined" motion in limine to preclude UTCO
from presenting evidence regarding defendants' alteration of serial numbers and subsequent sale of
the Houseboat with the serial number that was on the MSO sent to UTCO. R. 1486-90. Thereafter,
on the opening day of trial, defendants filed two more "combined" motions in limine to preclude the
testimony of witnesses and presentation of other evidence regarding that same issue. R.154147,1560-64. The trial court discussed the matter at length in with the parties' counsel in chambers
and off the record. Upon return to the courtroom, defendants' counsel indicated that he had nothing
further to say on the record which had not been previously covered in chambers. R. 1904. The trial
court then asked UTCO's counsel several questions and UTCO's counsel indicated that cases cited
to the trial court "indicate very clearly that subsequent events can help to establish the fraudulent
intention of the defendant at the time that the act occurs. . . .1 think the fact finder should be looking
to all of the facts and circumstances in order to fairly evaluate and understand." R. 1908. The Court
stated:
I'm going to grant the motion. I can't see any relevance to the proposition
that the, at least based on what I've heard so far, that the reassignment of a serial
number to another boat, to a third person who is not claiming to be involved in this
situation, has any relevance to the state of mind of the defendant for purposes of
committing fraud at the time these representations were made. I recognize after
events may have some probative value, but in this case I can't see what it might be.

The Court should note as stated above, the subsequent sale of the Houseboat to another party was presented to
the jury. See supra n. 20 and accompanying text.
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The fact that the boat with a serial number did not exist, and was never built
to the specifications in the original invoice, is all the plaintiff needs in that regard. The
rest of it is surplusage and a waste of time. Unless the evidence changes, it's not
coming in. The Motion is granted.
That doesn't mean you can't put in evidence that there never was a boat with
that serial number, or that was the serial number on the invoices and there is no such
boat, but its' not, I don't see any relevance to the fact that serial number now appears
on some other boat. The motion is granted. R. 1910.
The trial court erroneously precluded the presentation of this evidence because it deemed it was not
relevant and because it was "surplusage." As shown below, the exclusion of that evidence was
prejudicial to UTCO as it would have assisted the jury in determining the intent of defendants at the
time they made representations to UTCO that a boat would be shipped to Utah if UTCO sent money
to defendants. UTCO is therefore entitled to a new trial on its claims for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation.
Direct evidence of fraudulent intent is seldom, if ever, present. Thus, fraudulent intent must
usually be proven by evidence regarding all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction
at issue. Indeed, as noted by this Court, f,[a] Court may look to all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances and a continuing pattern of wrongful behavior is one indicator of fraudulent intent."
Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(emphasis added)(internal quotation and
citation omitted); See also Bails v. Car. 558 P.2d 458 (Mont. 1976) (holding that fraudulent intent
must be determined in light of all surrounding circumstances); Ledbetter v. Webb. 711 P.2d 874
(N.M. 1985) (holding that facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction may provide clear and
convincing evidence of fraudulent intent). In Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1262
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), this Court stated, "The existence of fraudulent intent is a factual question,
-22-

which may be inferred from all of the attendant circumstances. It necessarily involves weighing the
evidence presented and assessing the credibility of witnesses-tasks largely within the province of the
fact-finder.19
In this case, the reassignment by Sharpe and Sumerset of the serial number for the Houseboat
shown on the MSO they sent to Nelson to a second, different, houseboat manufactured by Sharpe
and Sumerset and the subsequent sale of the second houseboat are some of the facts and
circumstances that the jury should have been allowed to examine to determine whether Sharpe and
Sumerset possessed the requisite fraudulent intent. Indeed, evidence that Sharpe and Sumerset
reassigned the serial number only three or four months after they attempted to void the sale of the
Houseboat to Zimmerman without giving notice to UTCO is proof that Sharpe and Sumerset never
intended to consummate their transaction with Zimmerman and UTCO. That evidence was clearly
relevant to UTCO's fraud claim.
Sharpe and Sumerset argued at trial that the evidence in question was not relevant because
the assignment of the serial number to a different boat and the sale of that boat occurred several
months after the transaction with UTCO. As UTCO argued to the trial court, however, subsequent
conduct supports an inference of prior intent not to fulfill a promise or representation. See, e.g..
Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co.. 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
Indeed, as noted by one Court, "[s]ince fraud is usually denied, it must be inferred from all facts and
circumstances . . . including subsequent conduct." Garden State Standardbred Sales Co. Inc. v.
l9

CitingIn re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343. 1349 (Utah 1994); State v. Delaney 869 P.2d 4. 6 (Utah App. 1994);
State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037. 1040 n. 4 (Utah App. 1993). affd 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995); State v. Garrett,
849 P.2d 578. 582 (Utah App.). cert denied 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
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Seese, 611 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (emphasis added).
In sum, evidence that Sharpe and Sumerset reassigned the serial number for the Houseboat
shown on the MSO they sent to Nelson to a different houseboat and then subsequently sold the
second houseboat is relevant to UTCO's fraud claim, specifically on the issue of fraudulent intent.
The fact that this conduct occurred three or four months after Sharpe and Sumerset attempted to void
their transaction with Zimmerman and UTCO does not in any way diminish the relevance of that
evidence. The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion in limine and UTCO is entitled to
a new trial on its claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
CONCLUSION
The trial court improperly dismissed plaintiffs claim for promissory estoppel and erroneously
excluded evidence regarding reassignment of serial number for the houseboat. Plaintiff prays that the
judgment of the trial court be vacated and that this action be remanded for a new trial on plaintiffs
causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, punitive damages, and
breach of contract.
DATED this 23rd day of October, 1997.
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR

/Jeffrey M. Jones
i J/Mark Gibb
^Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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RCP Rule 12, RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
*25 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART IIL PLEADINGS, MOTIONS,
AND ORDERS
Current with amendments received through
10-15-96.
RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
(a) When Presented. A defendant shall serve his
answer within twenty days after the service of the
summons and complaint is complete unless
otherwise expressly provided by statute or order
of the court. A party served with a pleading
stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an
answer thereto within twenty days after the service
upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days
after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered
by the court, within twenty days after service of
the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The
service of a motion under this rule alters these
periods of time as follows, unless a different time
is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones
its disposition until the trial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more
definite statement, the responsive pleading shall
be served within ten days after the service of the
more definite statement.
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or
fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6)

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party.
A motion making any of these defenses shall be
made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by
being joined with one or more other defenses or
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or
by further pleading after the denial of such motion
or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for
relief to which the adverse party is not required to
serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
*26 (c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
After the pleadings are closed but within such
time as not to delay the trial, any party may move
for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary Hearings.
The defenses
specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b)
of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by
motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in
subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any
party, unless the court orders that the hearings and
determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a
pleading to which a responsive pleading is
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party
cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading, he may move for a more
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RCP Rule 12, RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
definite statement before interposing his
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out
the defects complained of and the details desired.
If the motion is granted and the order of the court
is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the
order or within such other time as the court may
fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the
motion was directed or make such order as it
deems just.
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a
party before responding to a pleading or, if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules,
upon motion made by a party within twenty days
after the service of the pleading upon him, the
court may order stricken from any pleading any
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of Defenses. A party who
makes a motion under this rule may join with it
the other motions herein provided for and then
available to him. If a party makes a motion under
this rule and does not include therein all defenses
and objections then available to him which this
rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not
thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of Defenses. A party waives all
defenses and objections which he does not present
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he
has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except
(1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the defense of failure
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of
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failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also
be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light
of any evidence that may have been received.
*27 (i) Pleading After Denial of a Motion.- The
filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of
any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not
be deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for Costs of a Nonresident Plaintiff.
When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant
may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish
security for costs and charges which may be
awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and
determination by the court of the reasonable
necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with
sufficient sureties as security for payment of such
costs and charges as may be awarded against such
plaintiff. No security shall be required of any
officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United
States.
(k) Effect of Failure to File Undertaking. If the
plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered
within 30 days of the service of the order, the
court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an
order dismissing the action.
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RCP Rule 41, RULE 41. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
*84 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART VI. TRIALS
Current with amendments received through
10-15-96.
RULE 41. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any
applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by
the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for
summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation
of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in
the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal
is without prejudice, except that a notice of
dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of the United States or of
any state an action based on or including the same
claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not
be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant
may move for dismissal of an action or of any
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claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
tried by the court without a jury, has completed
the presentation of his evidence the defendant,
without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
The court as trier of the facts may then determine
them and render judgment against the plaintiff or
may decline to render any judgment until the close
of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment
on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless
the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable
party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
*85 (c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, CrossClaim, or Third-Party Claim. The provisions of
this rule apply to the dismissal of any
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A
voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone
pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of
this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any
court commences an action based upon or
including the same claim against the same
defendant, the court may make such order for the
payment of costs of the action previously
dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the
proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has
complied with the order.
(e) Bond or Undertaking to Be Delivered to
Adverse Party. Should a party dismiss his
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i)
above, after a provisional remedy has been
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed
in support of such provisional remedy must
thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse
party against whom such provisional remedy was

Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1997 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.

RCP Rule 41, RULE 41. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
obtained.
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REV Rule 401, RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE'
*399 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND
ITS LIMITS
Current with amendments received through
10-15-96.
RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT
EVIDENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
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of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.

Advisory Committee Note
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is
comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules
of Evidence (1971), but the former rule defined
relevant evidence as that haviiig a tendency to
prove or disprove the existence of any "material
fact." Avoiding the use of the term "material fact"
accords with the application given to former Rule
1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court. State v.
Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).
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REV Rule 403, RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME

*401 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND
ITS LIMITS
Current with amendments received through
10-15-96.
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT
EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
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Advisory Committee Note
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is
substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules
of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not
included as a basis for exclusion of relevant
evidence. The change in language is not one of
substance, since "surprise" would be within the
concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule
402 [Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee
Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a
continuance in most instances would be a more
appropriate method of dealing with "surprise."
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F.Supp. 647
(N.D.Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following Utah
cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions Coop.
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State
v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v.
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
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SURPLUS
stock, without deducting debts or liabilities;
and as the accumulation of moneys or property
in excess of the par value of the stock.
As to surplus Earnings; Profit, and Water,
see those titles.
Accumulated surplus. That surplus which results from the accumulation of profits.
Acquired surplus. Surplus acquired by the
purchase of one business by another.
Appreciation surplus. Surplus which results
from the revaluation of the assets of a business.
Appropriated surplus. That portion of surplus
which is earmarked or set aside for a specific
purpose.
Capital surplus. All surplus which does not
arise from the accumulation of profits. It may
be created by a financial reorganization or by
gifts to the corporation. The entire surplus of
a corporation other than its earned surplus.
Earned surplus. The portion of the surplus of a
corporation equal to the balance of its net profits, income, gains and losses from the date of
incorporation, or from the latest date when a
deficit was eliminated by an application of its
capital surplus or stated capital or otherwise,
after deducting subsequent distributions to
shareholders and transfers to stated capital and
capital surplus to the extent such distributions
and transfers are made out of earned surplus.
Earned surplus shall include also any portion of
surplus allocated to earned surplus in mergers,
consolidations or acquisitions of all or substantially all of the outstanding shares or of the
property and assets of another corporation, domestic or foreign. See also Earned surplus.
Initial surplus. That surplus which appears on
the financial statement at the commencement
of an accounting period and which does not
reflect the operations for the period covered by
the statement.
Operating surplus. That surplus transferred to
earned surplus at the end of an accounting
period.
Paid-in surplus. Surplus paid in by stockholders as contrasted to earned surplus that arises
from profits.
Reserved surplus. See Appropriated surplus,
above.
Revaluation surplus. Surplus arising from a
revaluation of assets above cost, usually in
connection with a recapitalization (sometimes
called "recapitalization surplus") or quasi-reorganization (sometimes called "reorganization
surplus").
Unearned surplus. Includes paid-in surplus, revaluation surplus, and donated surplus.
Surplusage. Extraneous, impertinent, superfluous, or unnecessary matter. The remainder or
surplus of money left. See also Surplus.
Pleading. Allegations of matter wholly foreign
and impertinent to the cause. All matter be-
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yond the circumstances necessary to constitute]
the action. Any allegation without which thel
pleading would yet be adequate. On motion,*
the court may order stricken from the pleadings any insufficient defense, redundant, immaterial, or scandalous matter. Fed.R.Civil P.
12(f)Surprise. Act of taking unawares; sudden confusion or perplexity. In its legal acceptation,
denotes an unforeseen disappointment against
which ordinary prudence would not have afforded protection.
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding because of surprise. Fe&R.Civil P.'
60(b).
Ground for new trial. As a ground for a new
trial, that situation in which a party is unexpectedly placed without fault on his part,
which will work injury to his interests. He
must show himself to have been diligent at
every stage of the proceedings, and that the
event was one which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against. A situation or result
produced, having a substantive basis of fact
and reason, from which the court may justly
deduce, as a legal conclusion, that the party
will surfer a judicial wrong if not relieved from
his mistake. The general rule is that when a
party or his counsel is "taken by surprise," in a
material point or circumstance which could not
have been anticipated, and when want of skill,
care, or attention cannot be justly imputed, and
injustice has been done, a new trial should be
granted.
Surrebutter /sarebadar/. In common law pleading, the plaintiffs answer of fact to the defendant's rebutter. It is governed by the same rules
as the replication. It is no longer required
under modern pleading.
Surrejoinder /sarejoyndar/. In common law
pleading, the plaintiffs answer of fact to the
defendant's rejoinder. It is governed in every
respect by the same rules as the replication.
Surrender. To give back; yield; render up; restore; and in law, the giving up of an estate to
the person who has it in reversion or remainder, so as to merge it in the larger estate. A
yielding up of an estate for life or years to him
who has an immediate estate in reversion or
remainder, wherein the estate for life or years
may drown by mutual agreement between
them. The giving up of a lease before its expiration. In old English law, yielding up a tenancy in a copyhold estate to the lord of the manor
for a specified purpose. The giving up by a
bankrupt of his property to his creditors or
their assignees; also, his due appearance in the
bankruptcy court for examination as formerly
required by the bankruptcy acts.
Surrender is contractual act and occurs only
through consent of both parties. Surrender
differs from "abandonment," as applied to
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INSTRUCTION NO.

X^

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

In this action, plaintiff claims that defendant promised to
deliver the Houseboat in Utah upon receipt of the money sent by
plaintiff.

A promise that one should reasonably expect to induce

action or forbearance on the part of another person, and which does
reasonably

induce such action or forbearance, is binding if

injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

If

you find that plaintiff has proven the foregoing elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff is entitled to damages.
References:
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979)
MUJI 26.15
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THE COURT:

I'M GOING TO GRANT THE MOTION.

I CAN'T SEE ANY RELEVANCE TO THE PROPOSITION THAT THE,
AT LEAST BASED ON WHAT I'VE HEARD SO FAR, THAT THE
REASSIGNMENT OF A SERIAL NUMBER TO ANOTHER BOAT, TO A
THIRD PERSON WHO IS NOT CLAIMING TO BE INVOLVED IN
THIS SITUATION, HAS ANY RELEVANCE TO THE STATE OF MIND
OF THE DEFENDANT FOR PURPOSES OF COMMITTING FRAUD AT
THE TIME THESE REPRESENTATIONS WERE MADE. I RECOGNIZE
AFTER EVENTS MAY HAVE SOME PROBATIVE VALUE, BUT IN
THIS CASE I CAN'T SEE WHAT IT MIGHT BE.
THE FACT THAT THE BOAT WITH A SERIAL NUMBER
DID NOT EXIST, AND WAS NEVER BUILT TO THE
SPECIFICATIONS IN THE ORIGINAL INVOICE, IS ALL THE
PLAINTIFF NEEDS IN THAT REGARD. THE REST OF IT IS
SURPLUSAGE AND A WASTE OF TIME. UNLESS THE EVIDENCE
CHANGES, IT'S NOT COMING IN.

THE MOTION IS GRANTED.

THAT DOESN'T MEAN YOU CAN'T PUT IN EVIDENCE
THAT THERE WAS NEVER A BOAT WITH THAT SERIAL NUMBER,
OR THAT WAS THE SERIAL NUMBER ON THE INVOICES AND
THERE IS NO SUCH BOAT, BUT IT'S NOT, I DON'T SEE ANY
RELEVANCE TO THE FACT THAT SERIAL NUMBER NOW APPEARS
ON SOME OTHER BOAT.
MR. JONES:

THE MOTION IS GRANTED.
YOUR HONOR, I HAD A COUPLE OF

HOUSEKEEPING MATTERS BEFORE —
THE COURT:

YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE A JURY.
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SHEET ON THE FRONT OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS SO I HAVE JUST
NOTED ON YOUR COVER LETTER THAT EXPLAINS HOW YOU PUT
THE INSTRUCTIONS TOGETHER THAT THESE ARE YOUR
ORIGINALS AND NOT —

I WILL RULE ON THOSE, AS

INDICATED.
MR. HAWKINS:

THANK YOU.

THE COURT:

FINALLY, AS I ASK COUNSEL TO

AGREE UPON INSTRUCTIONS, AT LEAST THE ONES YOU COULD,
THAT DIDN'T HAVE THE FORMAL COVER SHEET EITHER, IT
CAME UNDER THE LETTER MR. GIBB AND MR. JONES SIGNED.
AND I WILL JUST MARK ON THE TOP OF THOSE THAT THEY
WERE THE STIPULATED INSTRUCTIONS.
I'LL HAVE THOSE PUT IN THE FILE AS WELL.
THERE IS A COUPLE OF THINGS I NEED TO SAY,
FOR THE RECORD, ON INSTRUCTIONS, AND THEN YOU MAY TAKE
YOUR EXCEPTIONS, GENTLEMEN.
I'VE INDICATED IN CHAMBERS THAT I WAS NOT
INSTRUCTING ON THE EQUITABLE CAUSES OF ACTION OF
PROMISORY ESTOPPEL. FOR THE RECORD, THE REASONS I HAVE
DETERMINED NOT TO DO THAT IS, I AM SATISFIED THE
PLAINTIFFS HAVE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW AND, I
BELIEVE, IT IS THE RULE THAT EQUITABLE REMEDY IS NOT
AVAILABLE AS LONG AS THERE IS AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT
LAW. AND I BELIEVE THERE IS HERE.
ALSO, I AM SATISFIED THAT THE CONCEPT OF
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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL BASICALLY MIRRORS THE CAUSES OF
ACTION THAT ARE BEING ASSERTED IN THIS CASE BY THE
PLAINTIFF. AND THEY'LL JUST BE SURPLUSAGE.
FINALLY, I'M SATISFIED THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS CASE THAT WAS CITED TO ME BY PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL, SAYING THAT THEY SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT THE
COURT MUST SEND EQUITABLE CAUSES OF ACTION TO THE
JURY, IS FACTUALLY DISTINGUISHABLE IN THIS CASE AND
I'M SATISFIED IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO SUBMIT THAT
EQUITABLE CLAIM TO A JURY, IF IT WAS OTHERWISE PROPER.
I'VE ALSO ADVISED YOU I AM NOT SENDING THE
QUESTION OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE JURY. AND I'LL
INSTRUCT THE JURY, AND I ASSUME YOU'LL TAKE AN
APPROPRIATE EXCEPTION, THAT THEY ARE NOT TO CONSIDER
THE EVIDENCE OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN CONNECTION WITH
DAMAGES IN THIS CASE.
I AM SATISFIED THAT NEITHER APPELLATE COURT
OF THIS STATE HAS HELD THAT ATTORNEYS FEES CAN BE
SUBMITTED TO A JURY, ARE OTHERWISE RECOVERABLE IN A
CASE LIKE THE ONE BEFORE THE COURT, WHERE THERE'S A
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, AND IT WAS BETWEEN
BUSINESSMEN, BASICALLY DEALING AT ARMS LENGTH.
I BELIEVE, THAT IF THE GENERAL RULE IS TO BE
FURTHER EXPANDED, COMMON LAW RULE SAYING THAT YOU
CAN'T RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES UNLESS IT IS BROUGHT BY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTCO ASSOCIATES, LTD., a
Utah limited partnership, by
and through its general
partner ROBERT D. KENT,
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT

CASE NO. 930904174

vs.
K. DeMARR ZIMMERMAN,
SUMERSET HOUSEBOATS, a
Division of SMI, and JAMES E.
SHARPE,
Defendants•

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from the appropriate
degree of proof, as set forth in the question.

At least six

members of the jury must find in favor of the answer to each
question.

When the verdict form is completed, the foreperson

should sign and date the verdict form and advise the bailiff that
you have reached
courtroom.

a verdict and are ready to return to the

1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that U T C O

Associates, Ltd. is entitled to recover on its claim of fraud
against defendant James E. Sharpe?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

\S (B)

If you answered question number 1 "no11, skip question
number 2.
2.

What

amount

of

damages were proximately

caused by

defendant Sharpe's fraud?
$

3.

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that

UTCO Associates, Ltd. is entitled to recover on its claim of
negligent misrepresentation against James E. Sharpe?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

If you answered question number 3 "no", skip to question
number 6.
4.

Considering all the negligence that caused UTCO's loss,

what percentage is attributable to:
A.

Plaintiff, UTCO

%

B.

Defendant Sharpe

%

C.

Defendant DeMarr Zimmerman

%

TOTAL
5.

100

%

What amount of damage was proximately caused by the

foregoing negligence?
$

0 01 G 7 1

find by clear and convincing
~ ~

evidence that

- •-

f-

plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages?
ANSWER:
1

,

Yes

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that UTCO

Associates, Mil. is entitled to recover on its claim of breach of
contract against defendant Sharpe?

ANSWER:

Yes

No /

^

^'

f\ 0 ^

fl^\.^£.*V

V T<L 0 / S K *Y f

If you dFiswPiPil question number / :-ii^f, answer none of
the remaining questions and have your foreperson sign and date \ DUJverdict. If you answered "yes" to question number 7, please answer
questi 01 i number 8.
8.

What amount of damages did the defendant Sharpe's breach

of contract proximately cause UTCO?
$

Dated this Zkfo

day of July, 1996.

FOREPERSON

0 016 7 2

